INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, high levels of military expenditures have characterized the budgetary structures of most Middle Eastern countries. 1 The basic patterns are well known, and for obvious reasons there has been an on-going interest among analysts (a) to explain the militarization of the region as a whole and (b) to search for variables to explain the level of defence spending of the major countries. This latter thrust has focused on factors such as economic conditions, population, size of the country, rivalries, and arms races.
Here, conventional wisdom stresses regional arms races as the prime culprit in accounting for the staggering military burdens, particularly those accrued by Israel, Egypt and Syria. Unfortunately, most of this analysis in this area has been anecdotal at best. In addition, many of the empirical studies of the region's militarization are based on models built largely on arbitrary and often unrealistic assumptions concerning the action/reaction patterns of the major participants.2 · The purpose of this paper is to identify from a quantitative perspective the existence of and causation involved in the region's major arms races. To avoid preconceived perceptions and/or biases, the approach is purely atheoretical, and is based on several new statistical developments in the analysis of causation.
DETERMINANTS OF DEFENCE SPENDING
A number of studies have attempted to isolate the factors mainly responsible for militarization in the Third World. The most comprehensive of this is the analysis undertaken by O'Leary3 and Coplin. 4 They identified seven factors as accounting one way or another for the observed patterns of military expenditures: economic conditions in the country, the role of the military in non-military affairs, internal security needs, reactions to arms purchases by neighbours, budget allocation to service branches in rival states, internal political support, and the age and condition of existing military equipmeQt.
The only apparent correlation was between the military budget and arms races and the budget levels in rival states. Apparently, both these factors acted as a 'reference point' from which individual countries might set their own budget levels. Along similar lines, Hill employed a sample of both developed and developing nations in his attempt to synthesize the various approaches used to examine the determinants of defence spending. 5 Hill was unable to find one 'overriding' factor which could explain a large proportion of the variance of defence spending patterns among the sample set. This led him to conclude that 'the military spending level of any nation is likely to be a product of a number of separate forces', 6 these include arms races, military alliances, status and rank discrepancies in international systems, military aid, size and wealth of the country, the form of government, the extent of military involvement, internal social friction, and internal political conflict.
The purpose of Westing's paper was 'to present some critical reflections that might prove useful to those concerned with military expenditures and proposals for their reductions' .7 In his analysis, he found significant correlations between military expenditures for 159 nations and their respective GNP levels, productive land area, and population.
In an important paper which related defence spending to economic variables, Ames and Goff examined defence and education expenditures in 16 South American countries for the 20 year period between 1948 and 1968. 8 They found that political variables were not the major determinants of either education or defence budgets; instead, they concluded that changes in the education and defence budgets were related to the level of available resources.
More recently, Maizels and Nissanke examined military spending data for 83 countries. 9 They hypothesized that the three main determinants of defence spending are the political framework, military activity, and economic linkages. The relative importance of each factor is in turn influenced by national, regional or global conflicts or interactions in the individual country. Using multiple regression analysis, they concluded that: Domestic factors, particularly the need perceived by ruling elites to repress internal opposition groups, and external factors, including relations with the global power blocs and the availability of foreign exchange to purchase arms from abroad, also appear to be major determinants of government decisions in regard to military expenditures.10
In 1986, Harris attempted to measure the effect of military expenditures from domestic economic conditions. In doing so, he examined the budgets (since the early 1960s) in five ASEAN countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.11 His main findings were:
1. Defence expenditures in the current year are positively correlated with defence spending and the central budgetary position in the previous year. 2. Current defence expenditures have a ~eak inverse correlation with inflation the previous year. 3. Although current defence budgets are not correlated with the balance of payments in the previous year, the balance of payments affects government revenue which in turn affects defence spending.12
In an extension of the Harris paper, Looney and Frederiksen examined the economic determinants of defence expenditures in Latin America. Ten countries were examined using time series data: Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador.13 Four alternative models were tested. The independent variables were current and lagged values of GNP, government expenditure, and military expenditures. It was found that 'a large proportion of variability in defence expenditures can be explained by economic variables; the overall constraint (GDP) and fiscal funding variables . . . '14 In extending Harris's work on the ASEAN countries, Looney and Frederiksen found three basic patterns: stabilization (Singapore), augmentation (Malaysia), and distributed lags (Philippines). All countries increased defence budgets as expected GNP increased. There were, however, significant variations between countries as to the timing of increased defence allocations. Specifically, Thailand exhibited a weak stabilization pattern. Korean defence expenditure patterns followed a long-run distributed lag function. In the case of Thailand, there was a weak stabilization effect. Indonesia was found to be a special case where resource availability was measured by crude oil production. However, there was a weak augmentation effect as measured by the expected and unexpected rate of inflation.
Clearly, a good case can be made that in the Third World economic variables constrain or at least modify the manner in which defence allocations are undertaken. Clearly the slow-down in military expenditures during the last several years can be traced directly to austerity programmes in countries such as Syria, Egypt and Israel. Saudi Arabia's reduced defence expenditures are also closely related to developments in the international oil markets.
However, in the Middle East factors liUCh as financial assistance from the superpowers, together with hydrocarbon revenues, undoubtedly buffer many countries from the economic constraints found in other parts of the world. Hence, the analysis below focuses on arms races per se.
Here, our purpose is to identify the patterns of causation between the region's major military spenders. In doing so, we hope to contribute to the literature in two respects. First, as is well known, causality tests are, in general, sensitive to lag lengths. The use of shorter lags than actually existed may distort the causal impact of defence expenditures from one country on those of another. On the other hand, relatively long lags may cause the absence of any causality between defence expenditures and economic growth. Few studies have used an 'atheoretical' methodology that allows data themselves to select appropriate lag lengths. Following Hsiao, ls Akaike's final prediction error (FPE) criterion will be employed to select optimum lag lengths for each variable in each equation.
ALTERNATIVE TESTS FOR CAUSATION
Several statistical tests are available for addressing the issue at hand. To date, the original and most widely used has been the Granger Test. 16 
Granger Test
Granger17 defines causality such that X Granger causes (G-C) Y if Y can be predicted more accurately in the sense of mean square error, with the use of past values of X than without using past X. For example, in assessing the relationship (the same basic formulation would also apply to the arms race between the countries) between defence and economic performance, Granger causality can be specified as:
Where: DEFA is a measure of defence expenditures in country A and DEFB is the corresponding measure for country B; p, q, r and s are lag lengths for each variable in the equation; and u and v are serially uncorrelated white noise residuals. By assuming that error terms (u, v) are 'nice' the specified model is estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 18 Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint F-test is commonly used for causal detection. The F-statistic would be calculated by:
where RSS(r) and RSS(u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted and unrestricted models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respectively, the degrees of freedom in restricted and unrestricted models. The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner. First, unidirectional causality from DEPA to DEFB if the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that past values of DEPA in equation (1) are insignificantly different from zero and if the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that past values of DEPA in equation (2) are insignificantly different from zero. That is, DEPA causes DEFB but DEFB does not cause DEPA. Unidirectional causality runs from DEFB to DEPA if the reverse is true. Second, bidirectional causality runs between DEF A and DEFB if both F-test statistics reject the null hypotheses in equations (1) and (2) . Finally, no causality exists between DEPA and DEFB if both null hypotheses cannot be rejected at the conventional significance level.
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags cause estimates to be inefficient.
While one can choose lag lengths based on preliminary partial autocorrelation methods, there i,s no a priori reason to assume lag lengths equal for all of our sample countries. For example in a different context -a study of causation between defence expenditures and growth in the Philippines -Frederiksen and LaCivita19 found no statistical relationship between growth and defence when both variables were entered in the estimating equation with a lag equal to four. When the lag length was changed to two periods, however, it was found that growth caused defence. Since both lag lengths were chosen arbitrarily, one cannot say which is preferred.
The Hsaio Procedure
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsaio20 has developed a systematic method for choosing lag lengths for each variable in an equation. Hsiao's method combines Granger Causality and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE) defined as the (asymptotic) mean square prediction error, to determine both thit optimum lag for each variable and causal relationships. In a paper examining the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, Thornton and Batten21 found Hsiao's method to be superior to both arbitrary lag length selection and several other systematic procedures for determining lag length.
The first step in Hsiao's procedure is to perform a series of autoregressive regressions on the dependent variable. In the first regression, the dependent variable is lagged once. In each succeeding regression, one more lag on the dependent variable is added. That is we estimate M regressions of the form:
m (4) DEF (t) =a+ Sum b (t-1) DEF (t-1) + e (i) i=l
Where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we compute the FPE in the following manner:
Where T is the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final prediction error and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal lag length, m*, is the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. Once m* has been determined, regressions are estimated with the lags on the other variable added sequentially in the same manner used to determine m*.
Thus we estimate four regressions of the form: m• n (6) DEFA (t) = a+ Sum b (t-1) DEAF (t-1) + Sum c (t-1) DEFB (t-1) + e (i)
i=l . i=l with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for each regression as:
FPE (m* ,n) = T + m* + n + 1 T-m* -n-1 ESS (m* ,n) I T we choose the optimal lag length for D, D* as the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is equivalent to using a series of F-tests with variable levels of significance. 22 The first term measures the estimation error and the second term measures the modelling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality property that 'balances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected and the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher order is selected'.23 As noted by Judge et al.,24 an intuitive reason for using the FPE criterion is that longer lags increase the first term but decrease the RSS of the second term, and thus the two opposing forces are balanced optimally when their product reaches its minimum.
Again using the example of defence expenditures in country A and B, four cases are possible: 
METHODOLOGY
The data for military expenditures used to carry out the Hsaio test were compiled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament. Two alternative measures of defence burden were used: (a) constant price defence expenditures and (b) the defence burden, the share of defence in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). When consistent price deflators were not available the defence expenditure term was specified only in terms of the growth of the defence burden.
Before the tests were performed, one statistical problem needed to be addressed. It is widely known that most economic time series are non-stationary. As indicated by Judge et al., 25 'stationary is an important property as it guarantees that there are no fundamental changes in the structure of the process that would render prediction difficult or impossible'. In order to remove all possible non-stationarities, real defence expenditures and the defence burden were transformed to rates of growth. When these transformed series were regressed on a constant and time, their coefficients on time ..,;ere insignificantly different from zero for all countries. Similar regressions of the untransformed levels indicated the presence of a trend.
The results for the causality analysis of the regional arms races together with the direction of country causation are presented with the final prediction error (FPE), the coefficient of determination (r2), together with the optimal lag. For simple organizational convenience the results are presented in terms of: (a) Arms races involving Israel (Table 1) ; (b) those involving Saudi Arabia (but not Israel- Table 2 ); and (c) other regional arms races (Table 3) .
It should be noted that if a country is not listed it is because no statistically significant military expenditure patterns were found vis a Perhaps the most complex patterns involve Syria and its neighbours (Table 3 ):
1. In addition to affecting allocations to defence in Saudi Arabia, increases in Syrian defence expenditures produce a similar response in Turkey. 2. While increases in Israeli defence expenditures produce a similar adjustment in Syria, those in Egypt do the same, but with a much shorter lag.
The only other major pattern in the region involves Algeria and Morocco, with Algerian defence expenditures affecting Moroccan military expenditures with a two or four year lag depending on whether one looks at the growth in the defence burden or in military expenditures. 
